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The Rise and Fall and Perhaps Rise
Again of the "Blindfold" Rule in
Modified Comparative Fault Cases: A
Proposed Experiment
Jordan H. Leibman J.D., Robert B. Bennett,
Jr. J.D., Richard Fetter Ph.D.*
I. Introduction
Wyoming and Illinois are among the states that maintain
systems of modified comparative fault.1 In 1994 and 1995 respec-
tively, the legislatures of these two states enacted far-reaching
* Jordan H. Leibman is a professor of business law at the Kelley School of Business,
Indiana University at Indianapolis. Robert B. Bennett, Jr. is an associate professor of
business law at Butler University, College of Business Administration. Richard Fetter is an
associate professor of marketing at Butler University, College of Business Administration.
1. The following are the 33 states that have enacted or have judicially adopted
modified comparative fault; the source of each is indicated: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-
2501, -2505, -2506, -2508, -2509 (West Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (Michie
Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-21-111.5, -111.7 (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit, 10, § 8132 (Supp. 1994); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 105-2011, -2012, -2012.1 (Harrison 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1993); IDAHO
CODE §§ 6-801 to -806 (Supp. 1997); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1107.1, -1116, -1117
(West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-33-1 to -12 (Michie Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 619.17,668.1-.10 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a, -258b (1994); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (West 1980); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-702, -703, -
719(5) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,185 to -21,185.12 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41.141 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507:7-d, -e (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:15-5.1, -5.2, -5.3 (West Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2315.19,.20 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13-14
(West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 18.470, .475-.490, .510 (1995); 42 PA .CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7102(a) (West Supp. 1996); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991);
McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 33.001-003, 33.011-013 (West 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -42 (1996); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1996); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879
(W. Va. 1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (Michie
1997).
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amendments to their comparative fault statutes' in which they
addressed the important procedural issue of how much civil juries
should be told about the operation of this law.' The two amended
statutes resolved this question in diametrically opposed ways:
Illinois opted for a "blindfold" rule, while Wyoming reinforced
what we will call its "sunshine" rule.'
2. In Illinois the comparative negligence amendments were part of The Civil Justice
Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7, 1995 I11 Legis. Serv. 224 (West) (codified
in scattered sections of ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. (West Supp. 1997) (chapters 430, 730, 735,
740, 745, 815, 820)). The Wyoming Comparative Negligence Statute was renamed the
Wyoming Comparative Fault Statute, 1994 Wyo. Sess. Laws 98 (codified at WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 1-1-109 (Michie 1997)).
3. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-1107.1 (West Supp. 1997) provides:
Jury instruction in tort actions. In all actions on account of bodily injury or death
or physical damage to property based on negligence, or product liability based on
any theory or doctrine, the court shall instruct the jury in writing, to the extent it
is true, that any award of compensatory damages or punitive damages will not be
taxable under federal or State income tax law. The court shall not inform or
instruct the jury that the defendants shall be found not liable if the jury finds that
the contributory fault of the plaintiff is more than 50% of the proximate cause of
the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, but it shall be the duty of the
court to deny recovery if the jury finds that the plaintiff's contributory fault is
more than 50% of the proximate cause of the injury or damage. The court shall
not inform or instruct the jury concerning any limitations in the amount of non-
economic damages or punitive damages that are recoverable, but it shall be the
duty of the trial court upon entering judgment to reduce any award in excess of
such limitation to no more than the proper limitation.
Id.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (Michie 1997) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Contributory fault shall not bar a recovery in an action by any claimant . .. to
recover damages for wrongful death or injury .... if the contributory fault of the
claimant is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault of all actors. Any
damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault
attributed to the claimant.
(c) Whether or not the claimant is free from fault, tie court shall:
(i) If a jury trial:
(A) Direct the jury to determine the total amount of damages sustained
by the claimant without regard to the percentage of fault attributed to
the claimant, and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor; and
(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the
percentage of fault.
Id.
4. We define "sunshine rule" as a rule requiring or permitting the legal consequences
of a jury finding to be made open and transparent to the jury. We analogize here to the
term "sunshine law," a law mandating that meetings of governmental bodies be open to the
public. See James E. Costello, Comment, The Linits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the
Initiative Power to Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAl,. L. REV. 491, 514 n.119 (1986). In
contrast, courts and commentators have used the term "blindfold" to characterize rules that
bar disclosing to juries the legal consequences of their findings. See, e.g., Kaeo v. Davis, 719
P.2d 387, 395 (Haw. 1986); Adkins v. Whitten, 297 S.E.2d 881, 882 (W. Va. 1982); Moore v.
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Under modified comparative fault systems, plaintiffs are barred
from all recovery if the trier of fact finds that their percentage of
fault in causing the injuries complained of is equal to or above
some statutory threshold, generally, either fifty or fifty-one
percent.' We will refer to this threshold as the percentage bar to
recovery or percentage bar. If the trier of fact is a civil jury, the
que;tion arises whether the jury should be informed of the
existence of the percentage bar and its legal and economic
consequences.
The question is controversial because both the doctrinal
arguments in favor of blindfolding the jury and those of admitting
the sunshine of legal knowledge into the jury's deliberations are
supported by long-standing traditions in American jurisprudence.
Proponents of blindfolding rely on the proposition that the role of
civil juries should be strictly limited to fact-finding; providing juries
with information about the legal and economic consequences of
their potential findings can only tempt them to usurp the judicial
Swoboda, 571 N.E.2d 1056, 1063 (11. App. Ct. 1991); Leon Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33
TEX. L. REV. 273 (1955); Michael J. Norton, Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power & Light
Co.-Jury Blindfolding in Comparative Negligence Cases, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 569. Sunshine
rules can be "mandated," see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5(5) (West Supp.
1996) ("[T]he court shall instruct the jury ... as to the degree of negligence ....");
"requested," see, e.g., Adkins v. Whitten, 297 N.E.2d 881,884 (W. Va. 1982) (court has duty
to inform jury when requested); or "discretionary," see e.g., Roman v. Mitchell, 413 A.2d 322,
327 (N.J. 1980) (court should inform jury of effect of answers to interrogatories, but has the
discretion to withhold). For a discussion of the evolution of Wyoming's sunshine rule, see
infra notes 63-78 and accompanying text, and for Illinois's blindfold rule, see infra notes 79-
117 and accompanying text.
5. Twelve modified comparative fault states set the percentage bar to recovery at 50%;
in these states, a finding of equal fault on the part of plaintiff and defendant means that the
plaintiff is barred from all recovery. Those states are as follows: Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and
West Virginia. See supra note 1. See also infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing why this formula is particularly problematic under a blindfold rule).
Twenty modified comparative fault states set the percentage bar at 51%; in these states, a
plaintiff whose fault is equal to that of the defendant recovers 50% of her damages. Those
states are as follows: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See supra note 1.
For lists and analysis of the authorities for these provisions, see VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, app. 13, at 391-419 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1993); HENRY WOODS
& BETH DEERE, COMPARATIVE FAULT 22-26, app. 515-932 (3d ed. 1996).
In three states, Idaho, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, if there are multiple defendants, the
plaintiff's fault must be compared with each defendant's separately so that where plaintiff
"is 30% negligent and defendants D, E, F are 25%, 25%, and 20% negligent respectively,
plaintiff recovers nothing." Id. at 226.
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function of using the facts as found to fashion or deny awards in
compliance with the applicable law.6 Opponents of blindfolding
argue that the complex assignment of apportioning responsibility
for harm done requires a well-informed trier of fact.7 The moral
judgments required for apportioning fault cannot properly be made
in ignorance of their consequences. Moreover, from even before
this republic was founded, the jury has been viewed as an institu-
tion of last resort insuring that the local community's notions of
justice will, if necessary, be applied even in derogation of the law.8
Both doctrinal positions have been discussed and debated in
the legal literature.' What receives but only scant academic
6. See discussion infra note 9 (cases and commentary favoring blindfolding).
7. See discussion infra note 9 (cases and commentary opposed to blindfolding).
8. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY, 57-95,266-72 (1994) (excellent discussion
of jury nullification). The author describes the 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger for the
"infamous crime of seditious libel," a law that made it criminal to publish "written censure
upon any public man whatsoever, or upon any law or institution whatsoever." Id. at 73-74.
The jury ignored the court's instruction to limit its findings to whether the defendant had
published the clearly censorious material and it acquitted Zenger. Abramson refers to the
Zenger case as "the defining moment for the American jury in the colonies." Id. The author
states that "[wiell into the nineteenth century, criminal juries frequently (and civil juries
occasionally) were instructed that the judge's statement of law was not binding on them; that
they could determine for themselves what the law was." Id. at 63-64 (citations omitted).
Jury nullification is generally discussed in the context of criminal law where the power to
acquit is bolstered by the double Jeopardy doctrine. While it is true that civil verdicts are
subject to the trial court's power to order remittitur and the appellate court's power to
reverse large judgments on the ground that the verdicts must have been motivated by passion
or prejudice sufficient to shock the court's conscience, certain answers by juries to questions
asking about the parties' mental states are unlikely to be disturbed.
To label the defendant's behavior malicious is partly to find the historical facts,
but it is also to render a judgment about its blameworthiness. Juries are
constantly presented with t hese mixed questions that jump the artificial law/fact
boundary. This is true in negligence cases, where juries decide the fact of whether
a defendant's behavior fell below the behavior expected of a reasonable person.
Id. at 91-92. See also Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1776-
1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2736-37 (1996) (speculating that jury nullification may be the
wave of the future).
9. Several various cases and legal commentary generally favor blindfold rules. See
McClure v. Neuman, 178 N.E.2d 621,624 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961 ("'Where the court indicates
how liability will be determined, it warns the jury of the result of its answers and permits the
jury to 'trim its course accordingly."') (citation omitted); McGowan v. Story, 234 N.W.2d 325
(Wis. 1975) ("[lt is reversible error for either the court or counsel to inform the jury of the
effect of their answer on the ultimate result of their verdict .... "); James G. Denton,
Informing a Jury of the Legal Effect of its Answers, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 10 (1970) (arguing
that in jurisdictions using a "special issues"-special verdict questions-system, the system's
purposes "would best be served by limiting the jury's considerations to the facts and not their
consequences"); Coleman Gay, Blindfolding the Jury: Another View, 34 TEX. L. REv. 368,
380 (1956) ("Ifjuries are to be allowed to disregard the court's instructions and to decide for
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mention, however, are the economic implications of blindfolding in
modified comparative fault cases. If proponents of blindfolding are
correct, knowledgeable juries will be moved by compassion,
sympathy, and bias to ignore or distort evidence in order to provide
plaintiffs with recoveries they otherwise would not receive. If so,
plaintiffs will win more often under a sunshine rule. While there
may be anecdotal grounds from ordinary experience upon which to
make such predictions, the direction and magnitude of the
economic effects to be expected from lifting the jury's blindfold
calls for systematic empirical examination. Given that defendants
in negligence cases are frequently businesses, the question of
whether to blindfold becomes a "tort reform" issue, and its
one party or the other regardless of the evidence, the parties' rights will depend solely on
the conscience of the particular jury trying the case."); Stuart F. Schaffer, Comment,
Informing the Jury of the Legal Effect of Special Verdict Answers in Comparative Negligence
Actions, 1981 DUKE L.J. 824,851-52 (1981) (concluding that informing the jury where special
verdicts are used "violates the comparative negligence scheme established by the legislature
or the highest court of a state"). Authorities from pure comparative fault states also favor
blindfolding juries from information other than the existence of a percentage bar. See
Robinson v. Murlin Phillips & MFA Ins. Co., 557 S.W.2d 202,203 (Ky. 1977) ("In order to
[decide contested issues of fact] there is no need for jurors to know the legal effect of their
resolution .... ); Mitchell v. Perkins, 54 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Mich. 1952) (holding that, in
Michigan, a general verdict state, the jury must not be told in advance what facts are
necessary to support the verdict).
Others generally oppose blindfold rules. See Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387 (Haw. 1986)
(arguing that attempts to keep the jury in the dark will be unavailing); Seppi v. Betty, 579
P.2d 683 (Idaho 1978) (pointing out the danger of f.iiig to inform the jury in states where
a 50-50 finding of equal fault bars the plaintiff fron recovering); Moore v. Swoboda, 571
N.E.2d 1056 (I11. App. Ct. 1991) ("The failure to inform the jury of the effect of its findings
in such circumstances [one percentage point difference can mean no recovery] may result in
a decision shaped by a misimpression [sic] of the law."); Roman v. Mitchell, 413 A.2d 322
(N.J. 1980) (observing that before comparative fault jurors were traditionally informed of the
legal effect of a contributory negligence finding); Adkins v. Whitten, 297 S.E.2d 881 (W. Va.
1982) ("[U]nder our jury trial system, it is incumbent on the court ... to inform the jury as
to the law that is applicable to the facts of the case."); Green, supra note 4, at 282 ("[Tlhere
is no blindfold known that will prevent a jury from thinking they know the legal effect of
their answers."); Glenn F. Smith, Comparative Negligence Problems with the Special Verdict.
Informing the Jury of the Legal Effects of Their Answers, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 199,
226-28 (1975) (arguing that the blindfold rule leads to erroneous suppositions by juries
seeking an ultimate outcome); Note, Informing the Jury of the Effect of its Answers to Special
Verdict Questions-The Minnesota Experience, 58 MINN. L. REV. 903, 927 (1974) (arguing
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's attempt to limit disclosure only to comparative
negligence cases was misguided because the rule "does not consider the role of the common
sense wisdom of juries in mitigating unfair laws and producing just results in individual
cases"); Norton, supra note 4, at 581 ("[A] continued parroting of unfounded concern over
jury sympathy and bias [will] result in nothing more than the preservation of a useless and
even counterproductive doctrine.").
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potential economic impact is of considerable interest to the
business community.1t
In this article, the authors, by way of background, first discuss
the origin, nature, and development of comparative fault in the
United States." We then present, in the context of the experi-
ences of four state jurisdictions, the history and doctrinal arguments
for and against informing the juries about the economic conse-
quences of their findings in modified comparative fault cases.'2
Although there are a number of rules carrying legal and economic
consequences which may be disclosed to, or kept from the jury-for
example, the rules on joint and several liability13 and statutory
limitations on damages 4-- this article focuses on the jury's know-
ledge of the existence of a percentage bar to the plaintiff's
recovery.
To answer whether lifting the blindfold has an economic effect
and if it does, how significant it is, the authors designed an
experiment to test whether a sunshine rule causes juries, on
10. For what appears to be the first time, a sunshine rule with respect to the percentage
bar to recovery has been supplanted with a blindfold rule as part of comprehensive "tort
reforrm" legislation designed to bolster the Illinois economy. See discussion infra notes 106-
17 and accompanying text.
11. See discussion infra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
12. See discussion infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text (the Wisconsin experience);
notes 58-62 and accompanying text (the Colorado experience); notes 63-78 and accompa-
nying text (the Wyoming experience); notes 79-117 and accompanying text (the Illinois
experience).
13. Some states blindfold civil juries on the question of who pays if a defendant is
insolvent, immune or unavailable for suit, or i; a nonparty is found to be partially at fault in
causing the harm complained of. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5(5) (West Supp.
1996) ("[T]he jury shall not be informed as to the effect of its finding as to the allocation of
fault among two or more defendants."), Other states are less restrictive, See WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-1-109 (Michie 1997) (providing that the trial court shall "[ijnform the jury of the
consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault"). This has been interpreted
to mean: that the jury must be informed as to the 51% bar to recovery; that the court will
reduce the award by the plaintiff's percentage of fault; that each defendant will be liable only
to the extent of its percentage of fault (no joint and several liability); and that the plaintiff
cannot recover for negligence attributed to a nonparty. See id. However, the jury is not to
be informed when a defendant is insolvent. See John M. Burman, Wyoming's New
Comparative Fault Statute, 31 LAND & WA lER L. REV. 509, 529 (1996) (citing Wyo, Civ.
Pattern Jury Instruc. Nos. 10.03, 10.05 (1994); Burton v. Fisher Controls Co., 723 P.2d 1214,
1222 n.6 (Wyo. 1986)).
14. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1(a) (West Supp. 1997) (providing a limita-
tion of $500,000 on recovery of non-economic damages); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-
1115.05(a) (West Supp. 1997) (providing a limitation on punitive damages equal to three
times the economic damages awarded); 735 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-1107.1 (West
Supp. 1997)(providing that neither of these statutory "caps" shall be disclosed to the jury).
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average, to increase the percentage of fault attributable to defen-
dants, thus generating more frequent awards to plaintift; then, if
true, the experiment will test whether average awards to plaintiffs
under a sunshine rule are greater than those under a blindfold
rule. 5 The experiment also provides a comparative measure of
the economic effects of the four principal defensive rule regimes:
(1) contributory-negligence-as-a-complete-defense; (2) pure
comparative fault; (3) modified comparative fault under the
blindfold rule; and (4) modified comparative fault under a sunshine
rule. 6
II. Historical Background
A. The Emergence and Development of Comparative Fault
The terms comparative fault and comparative negligence are
sometimes used interchangeably to refer to systems that require the
trier of fact to determine the amount of damages and allocate
percentages of responsibility for the harm complained of among the
parties to a lawsuit in tort. Strictly speaking, comparative negli-
gence is the earlier and narrower concept that applied only to the
parties' failures to exercise due care. 7 When a number of state
courts, led by California, concluded that a defendant's conduct
deemed tortious under strict liability principles might be compared
with the plaintiff's contributory negligence, the broader term of
comparative fault began to be applied."t Subsequently, additional
theories of liability began to be incorporated into the concept of
fault and have been subsumed into many state comparative fault
15. See discussion infra Part III.A-D.
16. See discussion infra Part II.E.
17. Early federal and state legislation applied comparative negligence principles to cases
involving injured workers, but, in 1910, Mississippi enacted a "pure" form statute that applied
to all negligence actions. See SCHWART, supra note 5, at 11-12; see also WooDs & DEERE,
supra note 5, at 19-20.
18. In the leading case, Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978), the
court held that, while there were "theoretical and semantic distinctions between the twin
principles of strict product liability and traditional negligence ... they can be blended or
accommodated." Id. at 1167. See also Jordan H. Leibman, Comparative Contribution and
Intentional Torts: A Remaining Roadblock to Damages Apportionment, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 677,
684-87 (1992) (discussing the role of strict liability in the transformation of comparative
negligence into comparative fault).
19971
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systems.19 In this article, the authors use comparative fault to
describe all tort systems of damages apportionment.
The advent of comparative fault in the United States traces its
origin to a general dissatisfaction with the nineteenth century
defensive rule regime in which the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff was a complete defense to her claim that a negligent act of
the defendant was a proximate cause of her injury.2" Although
the complete defense of contributory negligence originated in the
1820s in this country,21 principles of damages apportionment were
applied much earlier. Equal division of damages was the admiralty
rule in England until 1911 and in the United States until 1975 when
the concept of damages proportionate to the amount of fault was
adopted by our admiralty courts. 2  Apportionment based on
relative fault was also said to be part of Roman law. 3 This fact
might explain why its widespread use in civil law jurisdictions
antedated its introduction in this country.24
19. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122(c) (Michie 1997) ("The word fault as used
in this section includes any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty, or
breach of any legal duty which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained by any
party."); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116(b) (West 1997) ("Fault means any act or
omission that (i) is negligent, willful and wanton, or reckless, is a breach of an express or
implied warranty, gives rise to strict liability in tort, or gives rise to liability under the
provisions of any state statute, rule, or local ordinance ...."); IND. CODE § 34-4-33-2(a)(1)
(1997) ("'Fault' includes any act or omission that is negligent, willful, wanton, reckless or
intentional toward the person or property of others ....") (emphasis added).
20. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 469
(5th ed. 1984) (citing Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 281 N.W. 261 (Minn. 1938)): see also
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 10 (attributing the emergence of comparative negligence
legislation in the United States to labor agitation deriving from "the very harsh treatment
of injured workmen by the fault system through its trilogy of defenses-contributory
negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule"); see also WOODS & DEERE,
supra note 5, at 19-20.
21. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 451 n.1 ("The earliest contributory negligence
case is Butterfield v. Forrester, 1809, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926. The first American case
appears to have been Smith v. Smith, 1824, 19 Mass. (2 Pick) 621."); WOODS & DEERE,
supra note 5, at 5-6.
22. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 9-10; WOODS & DEERE, supra note 5, at 16.
23. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 8; see WOODS & DEERE, supra note 5, at 13-14
(also noting authority tracing the origin of comparative fault principles in civil law
jurisdictions to the medieval sea codes).
24. See William Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1953) (noting
that, in 1953, the United States was virtually the last stronghold of contributory negligence).
"The last vestiges of the complete defense disappeared long since from all of continental
Europe, which divides the damages. Great Britain, all of the Canadian provinces, New
Zealand ... have come to the same result, so that very little of the British Empire is left
with the common law rule." Id. at 2. See also WOODS, supra note 5, at 14.
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Prosser and Keeton list a number of doctrinal, historical, and
policy explanations for the long reign of the contributory negli-
gence defense in the United States.25  They suggest that the
defense has "a penal basis in which the plaintiff is punished for her
own misconduct"; or it may derive from the equitable "clean
hands" doctrine; or based on a proximate cause analysis, the
plaintiff's negligence may be seen as "an intervening, or insulating
cause" of her injury.26  The concept of contributory negligence
tracks with the tendency of early nineteenth century courts to look
for a "single, principal, dominant, 'proximate' cause of every
injury. 27 The complete defense's harsh bar to recovery is said to
discourage accidents and to represent "the highly individualistic
attitude of the common law" reflecting an "uneasy distrust of the
plaintiff-minded jury . . . in the earlier part of the 19th century. '28
Finally, it accommodated "a desire to keep the liabilities of growing
industry within some bounds.,
29
This last rationale was explored persuasively by Professor
Horowitz who described how American courts in the final two
thirds of the nineteenth century profoundly restructured common
law rules to accommodate economic development.3" Business
entities, especially the railroads, were frequently the defendants in
personal injury and property damage suits. Although there was a
reaction in the early part of the twentieth century to the harsh
effects of contributory negligence and other nineteenth century tort
defenses on plaintiffs, the fear that the adoption or enactment of
pro-plaintiff tort rules might have a devastating effect on industry
produced a moderating influence on the liberalizing trend."
25. KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 452 (citing authorities advancing the various





30. See MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860
62-108 (1977) (describing how American courts in the last two thirds of the nineteenth
century profoundly restructured common law rules to accommodate economic development).
Laissez faire ideas transformed the common law of contracts while liability-limiting rules
dominated the evolution of tort law. See id. The emergence of modem negligence principles
to replace the causation-based rules of trespass was the principal engine for this accommoda-
tion because negligence theory required plaintiffs to prove fault in addition to causation. See
id.
31. See id. at 230.
19971
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A look at three states illustrates the different range of views
set forth in approaching this trend during the early part of the
twentieth century. Mississippi, the first state to enact comparative
fault, chose the pure form32 which permits the plaintiff to recover
part of his damages even when he is found to be more at fault than
the defendant. However, this form was too extreme for Georgia
whose Supreme Court had ruled in 1904 that, in order to recover,
the plaintiff's negligence had to be less than the defendant's.3' By
contrast, Nebraska, which enacted a slight/gross system in 1913,
provided that plaintiff's negligence had to be slight and the
defendant's gross in order to recover. 4
In 1931, the Wisconsin legislature is generally credited with
enacting the model for the modified comparative negligence
systems that were to follow.35 Modified comparative fault repre-
sented a compromise: although modification is less harsh on injured
plaintiffs than the earlier regime of contributory negligence, its
economic effect on defendants is less severe than is the pure form.
This is because modification can only cut off claims viable under
the pure system; it can never enhance claims. 6 Thus, the argu-
ment advocating modification based on economic effect is a
32. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1910). Earlier, Congress had reacted to the harsh
effects of the common law defenses on injured interstate railroad workers by enacting the
second Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908 ("FELA"). 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1994). FELA
was a pure comparative fault statute that was emulated by several states to cover employees
of interstate railroads. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 11. Still earlier, Georgia had
enacted a statute in 1860 to protect railroad workers that provided for diminution of
damages when the plaintiff was negligent. In Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 79 S.E. 836 (Ga.
1913), the Georgia Supreme Court combined this statute and a statute of general application
that provided "a defendant is not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some way have
contributed to the injury sustained." GA. CODE ANN. § 51-17-7. The marriage of these two
statutes developed into the system of modified comparative fault now codified at GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-33 (1987). See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 5, at 601-03.
33. See Christian v. Macon Ry. & Light Co., 47 S.E. 923 (Ga. 1904).
34. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1929). Nebraska now has a modified system with
a 50% bar to recovery. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185 (1995).
35. The statute provides "that the plaintiff could not recover unless his negligence 'was
not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought."' WOODS &
DEERE, supra note 5, at 20 (quoting WIS, STAT, ANN. § 895.045 (West 1997)). See supra
notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Wisconsin experience). Arkansas
followed in 1955 with a pure form statute that was replaced two years later with a modified
system. See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 5 at 20. Currently, 33 states maintain modified
comparative fault systems. See supra note 1.
36. The modified system of comparative fault has been described as "simply shift[ing]
the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence rule to a different ground." Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975).
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realistic one. Whether it is a fair one is another question.
Arguably, a plaintiff primarily at fault should be sanctioned, but the
modified systems permit some partially-at-fault defendants to
escape liability entirely. 7
When a community selects a modified system, it would appear
that it is approving such a result. At the same time, the community
is building in flexibility by leaving it to the trier of fact to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff's fault exceeded the established
threshold. Making this determination is, of course, a fact-finding
exercise involving a weighing of the physical evidence. Still, it is
more than that: the trier of fact is asked to weigh the relative
culpability of the parties which requires making moral judg-
ments." If the trier of fact is a civil jury, two questions arise:
what should the jury be told about the economic effects its
37. "There is no better justification for allowing a defendant who is 49% at fault to
completely escape liability than there is to allow a defendant who is 99% at fault under the
old rule [contributory negligence] to escape liability." Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898
(III. 1981). See also KrET0oN ET AL., supra note 20, at 473 n.42 (listing authorities for and
against the modified system).
38. There is a split of authority whether each party's causal contribution to an injury
should be compared as well as the relative fault of the parties. One view holds that "once
causation is found, the apportionment must be made on the basis of comparative fault rather
than ... contribution." William Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Micti. L. REV. 465,481
(1953). Other authorities argue that both fault and causal contribution should be compared.
See WooDs & DEERE, supra note 5, at 118-19 (discussing commentators and cases advancing
this view). However the instruction is couched, it is clear that the jury will consider the
quality of the acts proximately causing the injury in making apportionment.
There is also the problem of apportioning causation. Once multiple causes have joined
to produce an indivisible injury, it is not simple to develop a principled method for assigning
causal portions to all antecedent actors. In the late 1970s, in several product liability cases,
courts ostensibly apportioned damages using a theory of comparative causation, the most
noteworthy being General Motors v. tfopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). The effect was
to reduce the plaintiff's judgment rendered under strict liability in proportion to the causal
contribution of the plaintiff's "unforeseeable misuse." id. at 351. The goal was to
circumvent the "apples and oranges" problem of comparing negligence with strict liability.
Id. at 352. See also Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry into the
Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV, 403 (1978) (discussing
the above-mentioned concept).
Other writers have sought to develop a general theory of causal apportionment for tort
cases. See Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts:
An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM, L. REV. 1399 (1980). These authors employ the concept
of "probalistic marginal product" ("PMP") to develop a technology that assigns damage
shares in simultaneous cause cases "by measuring the differential degree of risk to which
each cause exposes the plaintiff." Id. at 1408. However, this approach has been criticized.
See David Kaye & Mikel Aicken, A Comment on Causal Apportionment, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
191 (1984).
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apportionment finding might have on the parties, and how should
it be instructed with respect to the knowledge it receives?39
B. The Experiences of Four State Jurisdictions with the Blindfold
Rule
1. The Wisconsin Experience.-Certainly, one of the most
important roles played by the judge in an American jury trial is
shielding the jury from information that might prejudice the parties.
Sometimes these shield rules governing admission of evidence and
giving of instructions prove to be ineffective, even counterproduc-
tive, as jurors act on the inaccurate and incomplete information
that, despite these barriers, often reaches them during a lengthy
trial.
The rule governing whether to inform the jury in a modified
comparative fault case of the existence of a percentage bar to the
plaintiff's recovery has proven to be a matter of long-standing
controversy that has not come to rest. Initially, the issue became
intertwined with the form of verdict used in civil cases. In 1890,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, in order to secure bias-free
special verdict4" answers, juries "must not consider the effect
39. With respect to a percentage bar to recovery, the court may be required, forbidden,
or permitted to disclose its existence either upon a party's request or at the court's discretion.
See supra note 4. The jurisdiction may also provide how the disclosure is to take place, how
prior knowledge and logical inferences are to be handled, and whether counsel may argue
the information to the jury. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-4-33-5(2) (1995) ("If the percentage
of fault of the claimant is greater than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault involved in the
incident which caused the claimant's death, injury, or property damage, the jury shall return
a verdict for the defendant and no further deliberation of the jury is required."). Although,
the existence of the 51% bar is less than explicit, it is virtually certain the jury will infer it.
40. A special verdict is "[a] special finding of the facts of the case by a jury, leaving to
the court the application of the law to the facts thus found." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1731 (4th ed. 1968) (citing 1 Arch. Pr. K.B. 213; 3 B1. Comm. 377; Statler v. United States,
157 U.S. 277 (1895)). A general verdict is "[t]hat by which the jury pronounces generally
on all of the issues in favor of plaintiff or defendant;-distinguished from a special verdict,
which is that by which the jury finds facts only." Id. (citing Skelton v. City of Newberg, 148
P. 53, 55 (Ore. 1915)).
A general verdict accompanied by special interrogatories is a hybrid form in which the
jury answers specific fact questions but is also required to render a verdict for or against
either party. See Nollenberger v. United Airlines, Inc., 335 F.2d 379, 405 n.41 (9th Cir. 1964)
(applying FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b) which provides in pertinent part that the "court may submit
to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories
upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict"), cert.
dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). Rule 49(a) provides that "[tihe court may require a jury to
return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact."
FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a). Because the form of verdict is a matter of procedural law, the federal
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which their answers may have upon ... the controversy or the
parties."4 In 1907, the same court opined that in cases where
special verdicts are used, it would constitute "reversible error for
the trial court by instruction ... to inform the jury expressly or by
necessary implication of the effect of [a special verdict answer]
upon the ultimate right of either party litigant to recover or upon
the ultimate liability of either party litigant."42 In a later case, the
court held that counsel was also precluded from arguing the effect
of the answers to the jury."
The purpose of special verdicts is to brighten the line between
the functions of court and jury. A jury whose role is merely to
answer narrow questions of disputed fact is free from having to
render an ultimate-outcome verdict that goes beyond simple fact-
finding to assigning liability and its legal consequences. These are
decisions into which sympathy, passion, bias, and a measure of
frontier justice might enter, which could distort the evidence, or
conflict with the text of the governing law.' So, when the
rules take precedence in diversity cases. Thus, even in a state like Wisconsin, where special
verdicts are the rule, Rule 49(b) is popular because it "captures most of the advantages of
the special verdict procedures but avoids its disadvantages." SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at
307, see also discussion infra note 46.
41. Ryan v. Rockford Ins. Co., 46 N.W. 885, 886 (Wis. 1890).
42. Banderob v. Wis. Central Ry., 113 N.W. 738, 751 (Wis. 1907).
43. See Pecor v. Home Indem. Co., 291 N.W. 313, 318-19 (Wis. 1940).
44. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 306-09 (discussing briefly the advantages and
disadvantages of special verdicts generally and in comparative fault cases specifically). The
author lists three principal advantages. First, Control of the Jury: "The procedure causes the
jury to separate in its mind the question of the amount of damages plaintiff suffered from
the question of the percentage of his fault." Id. at 307-08. Second, Facilitating Judicial
Review: "Special verdicts (or jury interrogatories) localize error and allow a court to find the
remaining portion of the verdict valid." Id. at 308. Third, Simplification of Instructions: If
it is unnecessary to inform the jury of the legal consequences of its findings, the instructions
can be greatly simplified. See id. at 308-09. The first two advantages also accrue to general
verdicts accompanied by interrogatories, but not the third. As to jury control, Schwartz
acknowledges that critics of special verdict procedure find this to be a disadvantage because
it denies the jury "'flexibility' in dealing with law that may not be generally popular." Id,
at 308. Schwartz points out that "comparative negligence is of comparatively recent
legislative judgment. Therefore, the law should be applied as a legislature intended it, or it
should be changed at that level." Id. Professor Schwartz notes that another disadvantage
of special verdicts is the difficulty in framing the questions: "By accident or design, the
special verdict may fail to cover all the issues in the case or may contain incorrect
terminology." Id. at 306. Schwartz supports the use of special verdicts in comparative fault
cases:
At first blush it is difficult to see why the application of a special verdict procedure
to comparative negligence should be criticized. If the special verdicts are spelled
out in the statute, the awkwardness that compromised the common-law special
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Wisconsin legislature, in 1931, enacted a modified comparative fault
law,45 a blindfold rule automatically came into effect in cases
where special verdicts were submitted.46 The jury was to deter-
mine acts of negligence, causation, percentages of fault, and amount
of damages; the court would take it from there.47 The Wisconsin
model was adopted by each jurisdiction that adopted comparative
fault until the 1970s.48  Thus, the rule against informing-the
blindfold rule-was firmly in the majority at that time.
Blindfolding the jury proved to be problematic, however. For
example, a natural tendency for juries in close cases to allocate
fault equally, worked systematically against plaintiffs in states that
required plaintiff to be less at fault than defendants in order to
verdict system is eliminated. If they are not spelled out, recourse can be had to
the useful forms developed in Wisconsin and other states.
Id. at 307. Another commentator differs: "More than thirty-five years of trial experience
under both the pure and modified systems of comparative negligence, and having cases
submitted on both general verdicts and interrogatories have convinced the writer that in
many cases a general verdict is preferable." WOODS & DEERE, supra note 5, at 439.
45. See 1931 Wis, Laws ch. 242 (current version codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045
(West 1997)). See also Schaffer, supra note 9, at 830-31.
46. Although Wisconsin has relied heavily on the use of special verdicts over the years,
the procedure has not been incorporated specifically into the state's comparative negligence
statute. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 302. Rather, the courts are to refer to the general
special verdict statute codified at WIS. STA"'. ANN. § 805.12 (West 1997). Subsection (1)
provides:
Unless it orders otherwise, the court shall direct the jury to return a special
verdict. The verdict shall be prepared by the court in the form of written
questions relating only to material issues of ultimate fact and admitting a direct
answer. The jury shall answer in writing. In cases founded upon negligence, the
court need not submit separately any particular respect in which the party was
allegedly negligent. The court may also direct the jury to find upon particular
questions of fact.
See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 5, at 921 (noting that the Jud. Council Comm. Note to the
statute states that "[s]ubsection (1) is based on a recognition that in Wisconsin practice, the
special verdict is the rule and not the exception").
47. Wisconsin's special verdict submissions in negligence cases require written answers
to detailed questions asking the jury to determine whether the parties were negligent in the
performance or omission of specific acts and whether those acts or omissions were causes of
the injury complained of. Only if the jury finds negligent acts or omissions to have caused
the injury is it to proceed to apportion negligence in percentages attributable to the parties.
Finally, the jury is to determine the amount of damages of each type claimed. See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 302. For examples of typical special verdict forms used in Wis-
consin courts, see id. at 302-04; Smith, supra note 9, at 215 n.56. For examples of
recommended special verdict forms and gener3l verdict forms accompanied by interroga-
tories, see WOODS & DEERE, supra note 5, at 462-94.
48. See Schaffer, supra note 9, at 832 and nn.42-45 (citing the adoption of the Wisconsin
special verdict with blindfold model by Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota,
Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wyoming).
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recover.49 To avoid this result, Wisconsin amended its statute to
raise its recovery bar from fifty to fifty-one percent, but it retained
the blindfold." More problematic were the instances where the
jurors inferred, from the instructions or from counsel during trial,
the existence of the rule barring a negligent plaintiff. A "common-
knowledge" exception was carved out by Wisconsin and other
states to avoid reversal in these cases.: A "conditional question"
exception was developed by some states to deal with verdict forms
that ask a series of special verdict questions that have the effect of
letting the cat out of the bag with respect to the ultimate outcome
of the answers.52 Other states gave judges considerable discretiop
to remove or impose the blindfold when necessary to elicit
intelligent answers from the jury.53
Of the modified comparative fault states that were early
adopters of the Wisconsin blindfold model, 4 only Ohio55 and a
watered-down Texas56 (and of course Wisconsin) remain with the
49. Twclve states provide for a 50% bar to recovery. See supra note 5. If juries were
blindfolded in these states, they might "casually return a 50-50 verdict as a compromise ....
The jury does not realize the very devastating impact of its decision." SCHWARTZ, supra
note 5, at 312. In rejecting the blindfold rule, the court in Adkins v. Whitten, 297 S.E.2d 881,
883 (W. Va. 1982) stated:
The necessity for instructing the jury on the effect of its percentage finding of
comparative negligence is apparent in those jurisdictions like ours where a plaintiff
who is 50 percent or more at fault is barred from recovery. To withhold this vital
piece of information from the jury could conceivably mislead them into believing
that so long as the plaintiff is not 100 percent at fault he would recover some
damages.
Id. Currently, none of the states with 50% bars to recovery have a blindfold rule.
50. See Schaffer, supra note 9, at 831-32.
51. See id. at 833 (citing Banderob v. Wis. Cent. Ry., Ill N.W. 738 (Wis. 1907)). In
1907, contributory negligence was a complete defense in Wisconsin. It is probable that juries
inferred this rule despite special verdict procedures. It seems quite unlikely to the authors
that juries would infer the 50% bar to recovery that was enacted in 1931. On the contrary,
juries might easily and mistakenly infer the existence of a pure comparative negligence rule.
52. See id. at 834. Typically, a yes answer to an early question might imply potential
liability, while a no would not. A Texas appellate court held that conditional questions are
"permissible if the jury is not thereby informed of the effect of previous answers that
determine the case." Id.
53. See id. at 834-35. In 1973, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that a charge would not
be objectionable if it incidentally advised the jury of the effect of its answers. See id. at 834.
(citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court)).
54. See supra note 48 (list of states).
55. See McClure v. Neuman, 178 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
56. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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rule." Until 1995, there were no new adopters of the blindfold.
The conclusion apparently reached by policy makers in the large
majority of states is that juries cannot easily be dissuaded from
attempting to affect the ultimate outcome of their deliberations.
2. The Colorado Experience.-The first appellate court
decision mandating a sunshine rule in a modified comparative fault
case was Simpson v. Anderson.8 The Simpson court rejected the
Wisconsin approach stating:
We believe the better rule is one based not upon distrust
of juries but rather one which recognizes that jurors collectively
represent d cross-section of the conscience of the commun-
ity .... A realistic approach requires that we recognize that
juries will anticipate the consequences of their findings relative
to percentage of negligence ....
I.. Acknowledging that jurors will anticipate the effect of
their findings, we believe it preferable for the jury to deliberate
with an understanding of the true effect of the law rather than
under possible misapprehensions.
The manner in which the law applies to a given state of
facts should not be a closely guarded secret which is known
only to judges and lawyers. It will, in fact, ultimately become
known to at least some members of the community who will be
asked t - sit upon juries. It is far better for courts to be the
vehicle Dy which the operation of the law is explained ... .9
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed' citing a companion
case for the statement of its holding:
We are convinced that the legislature, when it enacted the
comparative negligence statute, intended to establish a system
in negligence cases which divides the responsibility for a fair
and gooc result between the jury and the judge. Such a system
enhances the chance of a pure verdict on material facts alone
... The only law which the jury members need to under-
stand is the law which enables them to answer the specific
57. Two pure comparative fault states, Kentucky and Michigan, have taken positions
against informing juries about the legal consequences of their findings. See Robinson v.
Murlin Phillips & MFA Ins. Co., 557 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. 1977); Mitchell v. Perkins, 54 N.W. 293
(Mich. 1952). However, these states have no percentage bar; thus, jurors prone to speculate
on the law in comparative fault cases are likely to guess correctly.
58, 517 P.2d 416 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 526 P.2d 298 (Colo, 1974).
59. Id. at 418.
60. See Simpson, 526 P.2d at 299.
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questions asked of them in the special verdict form. Under this
system, it is unnecessary for the jury to concern itself with how
much the plaintiff receives . 6
The court of appeals argued that uninformed jurors will
naturally attempt to use their special verdict answers to produce an
ultimate-outcome. Jurors will be more likely to find the facts asked
of them if they understand the legal consequences of their findings.
The supreme court's position was that such distractions need not
and should not be permitted to poison the jury's deliberations.
Shortly thereafter, the Colorado Legislature sided with the court of
appeals and mandated a broad sunshine rule in comparative fault
cases.
62
3. The Wyoming Experience.-In 1973, the Wyoming Legisla-
ture enacted its first comparative negligence statute.6 3  The
language of section 1-7.2 of the statute closely followed the
Wisconsin law with its special verdict requirements. 4  In Wood-
ward v. Haney,65 the Wyoming Supreme Court opined that, by
adopting Wisconsin's statutory language, the Wyoming Legislature
also intended to adopt the Wisconsin judicial construction that held
it is reversible error to advise the jury in argument or by instruction
of the effect of its verdict.66
In 1976, the Legislature enacted section 1-7.7 which directed
that the ad damnum clause in pleadings for damages shall not state
a dollar amount; that this limitation shall not be construed to
prevent argument to the court or jury concerning the amount of
any party's claim; and that the court shall inform the jury of the
consequences of its verdict. In Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,68
section 1-7.7 was interpreted as a sunshine rule superseding by
61. Avery v. Wadlington, 526 P.2d 295, 297 (Colo. 1974).
62. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111(4) (1975) (currently codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5(5) (West 1996)).
63. See 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 28 (codified at WYO. STAT. § 1-7.2 (Supp. 1973)). The
statute was amended and renumbered in 1977, amended again in 1986, and again in 1994.
Versions of the statute prior to and following the 1994 amendments are reproduced in
Burman, supra note 13, in appendices A and B respectively.
64. WYO. STAT. § 1-7.2(a) (Supp. 1973) was identical to the Wisconsin provision.
Section 1-7.2(b), however, inadvertently omitted the requirement that, in a jury trial, the
judge is to reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the plaintiff's negligence. See
Smith, supra note 9, at 200 n.5 (quoting and discussing WYO. STAT. § 1-7.2(b) (Supp. 1973)).
65. 564 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1977).
66. See id. at 844.
67. See WYo. STAT. § 1-7.7 (Interim Supp. 1976).
68. 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 1977).
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implication the blindfold rule interpretation of section 1-7.2(a)
rendered by the Woodward court.69 The Johnson court held that
the earlier statute, with its reversible-error interpretation, could not
be harmonized with the plain meaning of section 1-7.7 and must
give way.70  The court noted that the Colorado Legislature had
amended its statute in language similar to section 1-7.7 and that the
state's court of last resort had construed the provision as "imposing
an independent duty upon the trial court to instruct the jury on the
comparative-negligence statute's effect" even though plaintiff's
counsel did not request it.71 The Johnson court came to the same
"independent-duty" conclusion in Wyoming.
In 1986, the Wyoming State Legislature retreated slightly from
this broad sunshine interpretation. The new provision, section 1-1-
109(b), stated:
The court may, and when requested by any party shall: (1) If
a jury trial: (A) Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts
determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of
fault attributable to each actor ... ; and (B) Inform the jury of
the consequences of its determination of the percentage of
fault.73
Under this language the trial court is under a duty to inform
the jury only if it is asked-in which case it shall inform. Note that
the Wyoming State Legislature seems to have had no problem
mixing a special verdict requirement with a duty to disclose to the
jury the legal effect of its findings.
The blindfold/sunshine issue was revisited once more in 1994;
this time, the Legislature worded the statute to conform with the
Johnson court's earlier interpretation: "[T]he court shall: (i) If a
jury trial ... (B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its
determination of the percentage of fault.,1
4
Why this change from requested to mandated sunshine?
Earlier we suggested that blindfolding juries with respect to the
69. See id. at 912-13. The court noted that when Johnson was decided, section 1-7.7 had
been enacted, but it was enacted after the events which caused Johnson's injury, See id. at
914. It was further noted that the express intent of the legislature was to apply the statute
prospectively. See id.
70. See id. at 913.
71. Id. at 913-14.
72. Id. at 913-14.
73. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(b) (1988).
74. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(c)(i)(B) (Michie 1997).
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legal consequences of their findings might have an economic effect
favoring defendants.7 5 We also reported that numerous jurisdic-
tions had become disenchanted with the blindfold rule because it
produced unpredictable and mischievous results as jurors sought to
render ultimate-outcome verdicts despite special verdict proce-
dures. 6
So what rationale was operating in Wyoming in 1994? Was it
a desire to benefit plaintiffs that caused the Legislature to beef up
its sunshine rule? Hardly. A commentator summarized the new
comparative fault statute as follows: "Whatever the intent behind
the new act, it represents a significant victory for defendants, and
a significant loss for plaintiffs .... Now the pendulum has swung
so far that in some situations, claimants are worse off than they
were under the 'harsh' contributory negligence rule."77  With
respect to the blindfold issue, we infer that the Wyoming Legisla-
ture was listening to the state's trial judges who knew well the
anomalous and inconsistent verdicts often rendered by jurors who
are kept in the dark. We do not know whether the proposition
that imposing a blindfold on modified comparative fault juries
might lower costs for Wyoming industry was even under consider-
ation.
With respect to the potential economic impact of a blindfold
on the parties, a Wyoming writer commented:
Although considerable attention and litigation have been
devoted to the issue of informing the jury, there is no empirical
evidence on whether advising a jury of the consequences of its
allocation of fault is beneficial to the plaintiff or the defen-
dant(s). For now, at least, the issue in Wyoming is moot. The
new Wyoming statute requires the court to instruct the jury as
to the consequences of its decision.78
Not every jurisdiction, however, appears to be waiting for empirical
evidence.
4. The Illinois Experience.-Illinois courts experimented with
comparative fault principles as early as 1858."9 In Galena &
75. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
76, See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
77. Burman, supra note 13, at 552.
78, id. at 531.
79. See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 888 (I11. 1981); Carol Isackson, Note and
Comment, Pure Comparative Negligence in Illinois, 58 CmI.-KENT L. REv. 599, 603 (1982).
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Chicago Union Railroad v. Jacobs,8° the court held that the
"degree of negligence must be measured and considered and
wherever it shall appear that the plaintiff's negligence is compara-
tively slight, and that of the defendant gross, he shall not be
deprived of his action."" This slight/gross concept evolved from
allowing recovery only when plaintiffs' negligence was slight to
instances where plaintiffs could recover by merely showing that
their negligence was greatly outweighed by that of the defen-
dants.82 These cases did not, however, provide for damages
apportionment; either plaintiffs recovered or they did not.83 The
Illinois slight/gross system persisted for three decades; following this
period, decisions were rendered in a manner by which the doctrine
was marginalized or ignored.84 Finally, in Lanark v. Dougherty,85
the Illinois Supreme Court expressly rejected comparative princi-
ples thus returning Illinois to the regime of contributory negligence
as a complete defense,.6
Despite Illinois' abandonment of its experiment with compara-
tive fault principles, there was increasing dissatisfaction with
contributory negligence. As a result, the doctrine was softened by
exceptions in Illinois and in other jurisdictions.87 As interest in
comparative fault increased in the early twentieth century, a few
states and the Congress enacted comparative fault systems8 that
were generally credited with providing a more equitable distribu-
tion of loss.89 However, a number of attempts to enact a compar-
ative fault statute in Illinois failed to produce a law.90 By the late
80. 20 I11. 478 (1858).
81. Id. at 497.
82. See Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 889 (citing Chi., Milwaukee & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Mason,
27 II. App. 450, 453-54 (1888)); Isackson, supra note 79, at 603.
83. See lsackson, supra note 79, at 604 n.28.
84. See Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 889; Isackson, supra note 79, at 604.
85. 38 N.E. 892 (I11. 1894).
86. See id. at 893.
87. See Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 890 (discussing the defense's unavailability to a "willful,
wanton, or reckless defendant"; to a defendant who violated a statute enacted to protect a
plaintiff from his own improvident acts; or to a defendant who had the "last clear chance"
to avoid the injury) (citations omitted). Although the latter doctrine was repudiated, Illinois
courts employed it, nevertheless, without labeling. See id.
88. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
89. See Isackson, supra note 79, at 605 and accompanying text.
90. See Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445 (111. 968) (Ward, J., dissenting).
The plaintiff-appellant declares, without contradiction being offered, that since
1937 there have been nine attempts in our legislature to change our contributory
negligence rule and that without a single exception none reached the floor of
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1960s, national interest in comparative fault had increased and
resistance to it by the insurance industry had diminished. Com-
mentators suggest that the emergence of no-fault auto insurance
convinced the industry that comparative fault principles offered an
acceptable alternative to the radical no-fault proposals.9
When the Florida Supreme Court judicially adopted compar-
ative fault in 1973,92 several states followed suit. The reasoning
of the courts in these states was that, inasmuch as contributory
negligence was a judge-made rule, the courts had the power to
replace it with a better rule.93
Six years before the Florida adoption, an Illinois Court of
Appeals, in Maki v. Frelk,94 attempted to do just that. It ruled
that the Wisconsin form of modified comparative fault should
govern the case.95 But the status quo was restored when the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed Maki 6 in the face of considerable
commentary favoring the mid-level court's initiative.97  The
supreme court had opined in Maki that it was up to the legislature
to act,98 but when no legislation was enacted in the following
thirteen years, the court, in Alvis v. Ribar,99 followed the Florida
precedent by judicially adopting a pure comparative fault sys-
tem.1" rhe court abolished contributory negligence answering
either House. The prospect of securing through legislation a rule better styled to
achieve fair dispositions in negligence cases does not appear to be bright.
Id. at 450.
91, See Isackson, supra note 79, at 606 (citing John G. Fleming, The Supreme Court of
Califbrnia 1974-1975, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64
CAL.. L. REV. 239, 240 (1976)).
92. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (since codified at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.81 (West 1997)).
93. See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 895 (I1l. 1981) (cases cited for this proposition
from Alaska, California, Florida, Michigan, New Mexico, and West Virginia).
94. 229 N.E.2d 284 (Il1. App. Ct. 1967), rev'd, 239 N.E.2d 445 (11. 1968).
95. See id. at 290.
96. Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445, 448 (11. 1968).
97. See Isackson, supra note 79, at 609 (noting that "in a Vanderbilt University Sympo-
sium, five out of the six participants favored the idea of judicial change"); Comment,
Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or
Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 889, 899 (1968).
98. See Maki, 239 N.E.2d at 447.
99. 421 N.E.2d 886 (111. 1981),
100. See id. at 898. The court disagreed with the defense's contention that the failure of
the Illinois General Assembly to enact any of the six bills introduced since 1976 was "a sign
of the of the General Assembly's desire to retain the present [contributory negligence] status
of the rule." Id. at 895. Rather, the inaction can be attributed "'to its feeling that it is more
appropriate, considering the history of the question in Illinois, for the judiciary to act."' Id.
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criticisms that judicial adoption leaves too many details undecided
by stating: "We believe that the use of special verdicts and special
interrogatories will serve as a guide to assist the jury in its
deliberations. We leave the resolution of other collateral issues to
future cases."' 0'
By adopting pure comparative fault, the court avoided the
issue that is the focus of this article: under the pure system there
is no percentage bar to recovery and, thus, there is no reason to
inform juries. In 1986, however, the Illinois Legislature finally
enacted a modified comparative fault law."0 2 With respect to jury
instructions, the statute provided that "[t]he court shall instruct the
jury in writing that the defendant shall be found not liable if the
jury finds that the contributory fault of the plaintiff is more than
50% of the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which
recovery is sought."'0 3
Despite its retreat to the pro-defendant modified comparative
fault regime," the Illinois Legislature had opted for an explicit,
mandated sunshine rule. Apparently, the confused and inconsistent
verdicts experienced by other jurisdictions with blindfolding the
jury outweighed any considerations that plaintiffs' increased
chances of recovery might have a negative impact on the Illinois
economy.
But in the 1994 elections, American voters seemed to be
signaling strongly that they wanted less governmental intrusion into
the private sector. Pro-business tort reform litigation systems were
presented by conservative politicians to the voters as a vital part of
the agenda. 5 In a number of states, after 1994, the legislative
(quoting Maki, 239 N.E.2d at 450 (Ward, J.,dissenting)).
We believe that the proper relationship between the legislature and the court is
one of cooperation and assistance in examining and changing the common law to
conform with the ever-changing demands of the community. There are, however,
times when there exists a mutual state of inaction in which the court awaits action
by the legislature and the legislature awaits guidance from the court, Such a
stalemate is a manifest injustice to the public.
Id. at 896.
101. Id. at 898.
102. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1107.1, -1116, -1117 (West 1997) (statute as
renumbered in 1990).
103. Id. at 5/2-1107.1.
104. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., David Frum, Tort Reform, One Step Forward, One Step Back, WALL ST.
J., May 27, 1992, at A15; Ellen J. Pollack, Quayle Calls for Changes in Legal System, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 14, 1991, at B10; Aric Press et al., Are Lawyers Burning America?, NEWSWEEK,
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votes for substantial tort reform were present. Probably, the most
comprehensive "reform" bill to become law was that of Illinois.'
06
In a published statement, the sponsor of the legislation made clear
that the Act's objectives were to reduce the costs of liability and
litigation.0 7 Constituencies named to benefit included municipal-
ities, small businesses, farmers, not-for-profit organizations, doctors,
hospitals, manufacturers, and taxpayers generally."8
The sponsor's statement included a section on the "emotional-
ism" so frequently invoked on behalf of injured plaintiffs."
Readers were reminded that "[t]he public debate over tort reform
has largely ignored the costs of being a defendant."" 0  It is no
surprise that the legislative majority saw the 1986 section in the
Civil Code on "jury instructions in tort actions""' as a provision
ripe for reform. The mandated sunshine rule was converted into
a mandated blindfold: "The court shall not inform or instruct the
jury that defendant shall be found not liable if the jury finds that
the contributory fault of the plaintiff is more than 50%. ' ',12 The
section also forbids the court to "inform or instruct" the jury about
the limitations on non-economic damages that were imposed
elsewhere in the statute."' This about-face by the Illinois Gen-
eral Assembly was the first time since the 1970s that a jurisdiction
has opted for blindfolding the jury on the percentage of negligence
question."4 Whether other states will follow remains to be seen.
Mar. 20, 1995, at 32.
106. See Illinois Civil Justice Reform Act of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7,1995 IlI. Legis. Serv.
224 (West) (codified in scattered sections Of ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. (West Supp. 1996)
(chapters 430, 730, 735, 740, 745, 815, and 820)). The Act is reproduced with strikeouts and
additions from and to the old statute. See The Illinois Tort Reform Act, 27 Loy. U. CHL L.J.
819 (1996). See also Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape as Congress Struggles to
Rewrite the Nation's Tort Laws, The States Already May Have Done the Job, A.B.A., Aug.
1995, at 57 ("The new Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 are touted as the most
comprehensive changes in tort law adopted by a state legislature,"). For overviews of the
Act, see Michael Gallagher et al., Illinois Tort Reform: The Judge's Perspective, 84 ILL. B.J.
124 (1996); J. Jeffrey Zimmerman et al., A Review of the Illinois Civil Justice Reform Act of
1995, 83 ILL. B.J. 282 (1995).
107. See Kirk W. Dillard, Illinois' Landmark Tort Reform: The Sponsor's Policy Explana-
tion, 27 LOY, U. Cmt. L.J. 803 (1996).
108. See id. at 814-16.
109. Id. at 813-14.
110. Id. at 813.
111. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
112. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1107.1 (West Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). See
supra, note 3 (section reproduced in its entirety).
113. Id. (referring to ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1, -1115.05 (West 1996)).
114. See supra knotes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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To underscore that the new Illinois jury instruction section was
not about the sanctity of special verdicts, or the traditional roles of
judge and jury that might be undermined if the jury were given too
much information about legal and economic consequences, the
section requires the judge to inform the jury that any award of
compensatory or punitive damages will not be taxable."' One
commentary predicted that the "overwhelming effect of this change
will be to reduce awards."' 16
With respect to the blindfold, the commentators stated that
"[i]t must be surmised that the reason behind the change is that a
sympathetic jury would be less willing to find a plaintiff more than
50% at fault and would manipulate the percentage of fault were it
told the law.""'  To test whether juries in the aggregate will
manipulate the percentage of fault-and if they will-in what
direction and to what extent will they do so, the authors propose
the laboratory experiment described in the Part III of this arti-
cle.11
8
115. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1107.1 (West Supp. 1997).
116. Gallagher et al., supra note 106, at 130.
117. id.
118. The empirical work that has been done on jury decision-making is concentrated in
the social science literature. For two surveys of this literature, its contributions and limita-
tions, see Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychological Research
on Juror and Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 90 (1990);
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Jury Decision-Making Models: The Generalization Gap,
89 PSYCHOL. BULL. 246 (1981). See also REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983);
Franklin J. Boster et al., An Information-processing Model of Jury Decision Making, 18
COMM. RES. 524 (1991). Most of this work has focused on the criminal jury process: see, e.g.,
Mark Constanzo & Sally Constanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Phase, 16
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1992); Richard L. Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of Approved
Jury Instructions in Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL, 455 (1995). Much of the
empirical work published to date studies the effects of personal attributes of jurors, race and
socio-economic background, or deliberation style on jury decisions: see, e.g., Jeffrey R. Boyll.,
Psychological, Cognitive, Personality and Interpersonal Factors in Jury Verdicts, 15 LAW &
PSYCH. REV. 163 (1991); Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in
Wrongful Death Awards, 25 L. & SoC'Y REV. 263 (1991). Relatively few works consider the
effects of differences in legal rules on jury decisions: but see Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury
Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments and Challenges on July Decision
Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1988); Ronald J. Mation et al., Factors Affecting Jury
Decision-making, 12 Soc. ACTION & L. 41 (1986).
It is somewhat surprising that relatively little empirical research has been devoted
to comparing the impact of extralegal factors to the various essential content-
oriented (legal) aspects of the trial itself on the decisions of the juries. Essential
content-oriented aspects of a trial may be described as the established conventions
of the court which constitute the substance of the trial, such as opening statements,
direct testimony by witnesses, direct and cross-examination from counsel, objec-
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II. A Proposed Empirical Laboratory Experiment to Compare
the Economic Effect of Blindfolded Modified Comparative
Fault Verdicts With That of Sunshine Verdicts
A. Overview
The authors concluded that field research into the economic
effects of blindfold and sunshine jury instructions was not feasible.
Actual cases differ widely on their facts, on the quality of physical
evidence, the personalities and abilities of attorneys, and the appeal
and credibility of witnesses. In addition, settlements, insolvencies,
and immunities significantly distort real-world verdict data.
Moreover, juries deliberate in secret so it becomes virtually
impossible to determine how verdicts in the field were reached. On
the other hand, the economic effect question appears researchable
using the laboratory methods of social psychology.
We propose scripting, producing, and videotaping two versions
of a simulated, personal injury trial conducted under modified
comparative fault rules. In the Baseline (Base) version the judge
will instruct the jury under a blindfold rule; in the Variant, the jury
will receive a sunshine instruction. Verdict forms for the sunshine
sample will reveal the percentage bar and sunshine counsel will
refer to it in the opening statements and closing arguments.
Groups of mock juror subjects will be recruited to view each
of the versions. After viewing the trial tape and receiving instruc-
tions, the groups will be randomly assigned to six person juries.
The juries will retire, deliberate, and render general verdicts
accompanied by limited interrogatories. The interrogatories will
ask for the total amount of damages without regard to any
contributory negligence, the percentage of negligence attributable
to each of the parties, and the amount of damages attributable to
each party as calculated by the jury's multiplication of each party's
percentage of fault by the total amount of damages suffered by the
plaintiff. The sum of the percentages of fault for the parties will
have to equal 100 percent.
Following each jury's deliberations, jurors will fill out exit
surveys which will seek demographic and attitudinal information
from each juror. The survey will also seek to determine the




sources in the trial simulation that influenced each juror and his or
her panel as a group in reaching its decisions with respect to
apportionment of fault and amount of damages. One item-set in
the Variant (sunshine) jury survey will inquire whether knowledge
of the percentage bar to recovery influenced them or the jury panel
to increase the percentage of fault attributed to the defendant(s).
To insure realism and maximize fidelity to the field setting, the
authors posit that it is important to use testimony and physical
evidence from an actual trial."9 In addition, an actual case will
provide a real-world benchmark verdict with which the experi-
mental verdicts can be compared. We will seek a modified
comparative fault case that turned primarily on issues of fact rather
than law: one in which credible evidence was adduced at trial upon
which reasonable jurors could differ as to whether the plaintiff was
more or less than fifty-one percent at fault; and one in which there
were multiple defendants so that the option of shifting fault among
the defendants by the jury can be studied. We require a negligence
case that lawyers and lay persons will likely agree is typical, and
because this will be a simulation, the personal injury should be
severe to ensure that the subject jurors will approach their task
conscientiously.
B. Variables and Hypotheses
The experiment's independent variable will be the existence or
i,,znexistence of the blindfold rule (i.e., a sunshine rule). The
manipulation occurs in the Variant version by the judge's providing
an instruction spelling out the percentage bar to recovery; by
submitting to the jury a verdict form that discloses the percentage
bar; and by references to the percentage bar in the attorneys'
opening statements and closing arguments.
119. See Pennington and Hastie, Jury Decision-Making Models: The Generalization Gap,
supra note 118 at 261-62 (referring to the lack of realism in many empirical jury studies).
[Sjtimuli are artificially constructed using all possible combinations of different
levels of factors, so stimulus cases bear little resemblance to the cases that jurors
ordinarily encounter in the courtroom. In practice, the cases have been greatly
simplified (e.g., containing only incriminating evidence) presented in a written
format (thus eliminating all visual observations, attorney behavior, and questioning
etc.) and contrived. Another simplification is the requirement that the response
scale be undimensional, continuous, interval scale. This bears little resemblance
to the juror's response choices in a real trial. In other words, what is gained in
control may constitute a serious loss in realism.
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The subject jurors can react-through the group behavior of
their jury panels-to the manipulation of the independent variable
in five ways: (1) they can choose not to reach an apportionment
verdict, in which case these panels will be deemed to be "hung";
(2) they can change the percentage of fault they attribute to one of
the defendants; (3) they can change the percentage of fault they
attribute to both defendants, which, since total fault must add up
to 100 percent implies an inverse change in the percentage of fault
attributed to the plaintiff; (4) they can change the amount of
damages awarded to the plaintiff; or (5) they can decide that no
changes in percentages of fault or amount of damages are indicat-
ed.
With respect to the last option, we should point out that the
application of a blindfold or sunshine rule is likely to have a
significant effect only in cases where the plaintiff's fault is arguably
at or near the fifty percent level. When the plaintiff's fault is
demonstrably either slight or gross, juries will be less likely to be
motivated by their knowledge of a percentage bar; therefore, their
findings under either a blindfold or sunshine rule are likely to be
similar. Policy makers who see the adoption of the blindfold rule
as a tort reform issue affecting their jurisdiction's business climate
should consider that many, if not most modified comparative fault
cases, will be unaffected by adopting either a blindfold or sunshine
rule.
We will measure changes in three principal dependent
variables. Those variables are as follows:
DVI: The percentage of fault attributed to the defendants. (It
is unnecessary to measure separately changes in the
percentage of fault .o the plaintiff because this is always
the inverse of the defendants' fault percentage.);
DV2: The frequency of the plaintiff's recovery;
DV3: The mean dollar recovery of the plaintiff from all juries
in each of the two samples.
The three hypotheses to be tested are:
HI: The percentage of fault attributed to the defendant by the
blindfold juries will be less than that attributed by the
sunshine juries.
Rationale: Knowledgeable juries under a sunshine rule
maybe motivated by sympathy for a badly injured plaintiff,
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or by dissatisfaction with the concept of modified compar-
ative fault. If they should wish to provide the plaintiff
with an ultimate award, they can increase the percentage
of fault attributable to the defendants so that the plaintiff's
fault will be proportionately lowered.
12: The plaintiff will recover more often under a sunshine rule
than under a blindfold rule.
Rationale: Sympathy and dissatisfaction, if present, are
likely to be manifested by more of the knowledgeable,
sunshine juries finding the plaintiff fifty percent or less at
fault than blindfolded juries who are ignorant of the
percentage bar.
H3: The mean dollar recovery of the plaintiff from all juries in
the sunshine sample will be larger than from those in the
blindfold sample.
Rationale: If, as we hypothesized in H2, the sunshine
plaintiff will recover an ultimate award more often, based
on that facto- alone, the mean sunshine recovery should be
larger than the mean blindfold recovery. But if the
sunshine juries should wish to temper their generosity with
smaller awards, the data may not support this hypothesis.
The verdict data from the Base and Variant juries wil! be
tabulated and analyzed. Means and medians for percentages of
fault and amount of damages for each sample will be calculated
and compared. Statistical tests will be performed to determine
whether the differences between the Base and Variant measures of
central tendency are significant. The exit survey responses of the
individual jurors will be tabulated and analyzed, and conclusions
from data relevant to the blindfold/sunshine experiment will be
drawn.
C Subjects
There are always trade-offs to be expected when using
laboratory methods. To obtain large samples and the statistical
power associated with them, there have to be incentives for the
subjects to spend substantial time participating in this exercise (we
expect the simulated trial, deliberations, and filling out of the exit
survey will take the better part of a day). We anticipate sample
sizes of approximately forty Base juries and forty Variant juries.
The authors coitemplate using undergraduate business students
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who will receive extra credit for participating as mock jurors in
conjunction with their introductory business law courses.
Undergraduate students are generally jury-eligible. If the trial
they witness is a typical negligence case, for example, a vehicle
accident, their status as students should not prevent them from
reacting to the events they see in ways similar to the general
population. Because some empiricists would find that to be a
heroic assumption, we will make no claims for generalizability
beyond the population of undergraduate students.12° We think
the data from the student samples will prove to be useful and
interesting, nonetheless.
There is no such thing as a typical jury. Regional and
demographic differences and the fact that many potential jurors on
the rolls successfully manage to opt out of jury duty,121 or are
involuntarily excused by peremptory challenges and challenges for
cause, tend to produce panels with highly skewed characteristics.
In any event, we contemplate a second stage to the experiment in
which a smaller sample, approximately twenty juries, will be
empaneled under a state's summary jury trial procedure. These
"ordinary person" juries will be run through the same simulated
trial process as the student juries. The verdict results of the
ordinary person juries will be compared with the student data.
D. The Median as a Measure of Central Tendency
Although policy makers are more likely to be concerned about
mean results, practitioners are likely to be more interested in the
typicality of an experimental outcome. If, for example, one is
representing a defendant in a severe personal injury negligence
case, the attorney will want to know what the typical verdict result
in such cases has been. If the available data with respect to the
percentage of fault attributed to defendants is positively skewed
because of a few juries bringing in massive plaintiff verdicts, the
120. For a powerful defense of the laboratory methods of social physiology in which
college students often serve as subjects, see Edwin A. Locke, Generalizing from Laboratory
to Field: Ecological Validity or Abstraction of Essential Elements?, GENERALIZING FROM
LABORATORY TO FIELD SETrINGS 3 (Edwin A. Locke ed. 1986); Daniel R. Igen,
Laboratory Research: A Question of When, Not If, GENERALIZING FROM LABORATORY TO
FIELD SETrINGS 257 (Edwin A. Locke ed. 1986); John P. Campbell, Labs, Fields, and Straw
Issues, GENERALIZING FROM LABORATORY TO FIELD SETTINGS 269 (Edwin A. Locke ed.
1986).




attorney will be well advised to focus on the median verdict more
than the mean. The median is more likely to represent his client's
exposure to liability although the client should be cautioned about
the possibility of large, atypical awards.
E. The Economic Effects of Four Defensive Rule Regimes
The verdict data from this experiment should provide an
excellent opportunity to compare the economic effect of four
negligence defense rules on a typical case.
1. Contributory Negligence as a Complete Defense.-The juries
in the Base sample will be charged under what is essentially a pure
comparative fault instruction. They will assess percentages 3f fault
and the amount of damages. If unbeknownst to the jury, contribu-
tory negligence were the ultimate-outcome rule in the jurisdiction,
only those plaintiffs who were found fault-free would recover
damages. The mean recovery under this defensive rule would be
the total recovery of the fault-free plaintiffs divided by the total
number of verdicts in the Base sample. We have read, however,
that juries charged under a contributory negligence rule in the past
have made ultimate awards to plaintiffs in derogation of the
instructions and evidence." Using the same simulated trial, it
would be interesting to test empirically how often that would
happen if the juries were actually charged under a contributory
negligence instruction.
2. Pure Comparative Fault.-To determine the mean recovery
under a pure comparative fault regime, we will divide the total
damages awarded the plaintiff in the blindfold sample before
modification by the total number of verdicts in that sample.
3. Modified Comparative Fault Under a Blindfold Rule.-To
determine the mean recovery under the blindfold rule we will
divide the total plaintiff award in the blindfold sample after
modification by the total number of verdicts in the sample.
Because modification by the court can only reduce the plaintiff's
award, it is clear that pure comparative fault is more advantageous
for plaintiffs than are modified systems.
122. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 469 ("Courts have become more reluctant to
rule that the plaintiff's conduct is negligent as a matter of law, and juries are notoriously
inclined to find that there has been no such negligence, or to make some more or less
haphazard reduction of the plaintiff's damages in proportion to his fault.").
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4. Modified Comparative Fault Under a Sunshine Rule.-If we
assume that the subjects in the sunshine sample are similar to those
in the blindfold sample, we can then calculate the mean recovery
under a sunshine rule by dividing the total plaintiff awards in the
sunshine sample by the total number of verdicts in the sample.
IV. Conclusion
Initially, courts saw the concepts of comparative fault and
special verdicts as having a natural affinity. The special verdict's
narrow questions of fact would permit judges to convert the jury's
answers into an ultimate-outcome judgment consistent with the
jurisdiction's comparative fault law. Although this approach tended
to separate more completely the functions of judge and jury, it also
narrowed the role of the jury to a point where it could no longer
serve effectively as the ultimate conscience of the community.
More troublesome, from a pragmatic perspective, was the confusion
experienced by juries who intuitively sought to influence, either
accurately or inaccurately, the ultimate outcome of their delibera-
tions by the quantitative answers they submitted on special verdict
forms. In particular, the modified systems of comparative fault
were the most troublesome because of their complexity and
because the ultimate outcome of the percentage questions was
often counterintuitive and frustrating to juries who thought they
were doing one thing only later to discover, to their dismay, they
had done something else.
The 1970s saw a complete reversal of this thinking; for over
two decades that followed, every state that enacted or adopted
comparative fault did so under a sunshine rule. Even states that
enacted tort reform legislation eschewed the idea of blindfolding
the jury with respect to the existence of a percentage bar to
recovery. In 1995, however, the Illinois General Assembly saw the
blindfold rule as an instrument to reduce the frequency of plaintiff
verdicts and the aggregate amount of damages that the defendant
class would incur. To these policy makers, the anomalous and
inconsistent verdicts that blindfolding the jury might engender was
apparently a reasonable price to pay for the economic relief to the
Illinois economy that the blindfold rule promised to deliver.
The authors take no philosophical or political position with
respect to the virtues or infirmities of the blindfold rule, but we do
urge that the assumptions of economic benefit behind the Illinois
legislation be empirically tested. We have designed and described
1997]
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an experiment that can shed light on this question. We expect to
implement this experiment and plan to report the data in a future
article.
V. Update
At the end of 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court handed down
its opinion in Best v. Taylor Machine Works'23 in which the court
held a number of key provisions of the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1995 to be unconstitutional'24 and the statute as a whole to be
"void in its entirety."'25 The court held that the section on jury
instructions,2 6 of which the blindfold rule on the percentage of
negligence was a part, was "not clearly invalid," 127 but so much
of the Act was Linconstitutional that the possibly valid remnants
could not be severed from the invalid to stand alone." The
court determined that the Illinois General Assembly would not
have enacted just these provisions in the absence of the $500,000
limitation on noneconomic damages, the abrogation of joint
liability, and the legislative abolition of doctor-patient privilege for
patients alleging bodily injury; all were provisions that the supreme
court held to be unconstitutional.
29
The Best court discussed three affidavits, which cited empirical
field studies, that were offered by the plaintiffs to challenge
eighteen specific economic findings and eight listed purposes that
were contained in the preamble to the legislation.13 The General
123. Nos. 81890, 81891,81892, 81893 cons., 1997 IIU. LEXIS 478, at *1 (111. Dec. 18, 1997).
124. See id. at *5-6 (identifying the following provisions as expressly violative of the
Illinois Constitution: the limitation on compensatory damages for noneconomic injury, 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1 (West 1996); a section of the Joint Tortfeasor
Contribution Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/3.5(a) (West 1996); the abolition of joint
and several liability, 735 ILL. COMP. STAr. ANN. 5/2-1117; and several discovery sections,
which required unlimited disclosure of plaintiffs' medical information and records, 735 ILL.
COMP STAT. ANN. 5/2-1003, 5/8-802, -20C0, -4uv.
125. Id. at *156.
126. See id. (discussing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1107.1).
127. Id.
128. See Best, 1997 I11. LEXIS 478, at *157.
129. See id. at *154-56.
130. See id. at *17-23 & n.1 (discussing affidavits submitted by Professor Neil Vidmar of
the Duke Law School, Professor Marc Galanter of the University of Wisconsin Law School,
and a joint affidavit from Stephen Daniels, a senior research fellow at the American Bar
Foundation, and Joanne Martin, an assistant director of the Foundation). Professor Vidmar
cited an Indiana study that showed an increase in malpractice claims following the capping
of malpractice damages. See id. at *19 n.1. Professor Galanter submitted data showing that
court filings in Cook County, Illinois actually declined during the period 1980-94 (prior to
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Assembly had advanced these findings and purposes to establish a
pressing need for the statute's enactment. The plaintiffs charged
that the legislative findings were based on the "use of chiefly
anecdotal evidence to justify the Act."'' Without valid empirical
evidence to support the legislative findings, they argued, there
could be no rational basis for the legislation.'
The supreme court held, however, that the plaintiffs' empirical
studies were not germane to the court's rational basis analysis.
"Courts are not empowered to 'adjudicate' the accuracy of
legislative findings .... Our task is limited to determining whether
the challenged legislation is constitutional, and not whether it is
wise."'  The Best court was able to find-apparently without
adjudication-that the statutory limitation on noneconomic
damages favored slightly injured plaintiffs while discriminating
against severely injured ones."M The provision was, therefore,
"special legislation" forbidden by the Illinois Constitution. '
The Best court makes clear that the task of determining the
factual basis of legislation designed to have an economic effect is
to be assigned to the legislature.'36 At this writing, the blindfold
rule is inoperative in Illinois; its chances for re-enactment are
uncertain.' In the future, when legislatures meet to consider
provisions governing jury instructions in comparative fault cases, we
would urge that they seek out valid empirical evidence-including
the tort reform legislation). See id. at *21. Finally, Daniels and Martin summarized
empirical studies showing "that only a tiny fraction of accidental deaths and injuries are
pursued trough the litigation system as claims for compensation." Id. at *22.
131. Id. at *19.
132. See id. at *23.
133. Best, 1997 III. LEXIS 478, at *24-25.
134. See id. at *44-48. In addition to the arbitrary classification drawn between severely
and slightly injured plaintiffs, the plaintiffs argued, and the court agreed, that the
noneconomic damages cap draws arbitrary and unfair distinctions between plaintiffs suffering
identical injuries and between types of injuries. See id.
135. See id. at *58. The court also held that the cap on non-economic damages amounted
to a "legislative remittitur," thus violating the separation of powers provisions in the Illinois
Constitution. Id. at * 65, *68.
136. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
137. Shortly after the supreme court struck down the Civil Justice Reform Act, it was
reported that the Democratic Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives was willing
to discuss legislation "that would re-enact provisions the Supreme Court had not singled out
and ruled invalid." David Heckleman, As Dem Leader Ponders Reviving Some Reforms,
Cii. DAILY L. BUL., Dec. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
However, supporters of the Act were quoted as voicing "skepticism regarding their chances
if the Chicago Democrat remains in control of the Illinois House of Representatives." Id.
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that derived from laboratory experimentation-when determining
whether the blindfolding of civil juries is likely to have the
predicted salutary effects on the economies of their jurisdictions.
